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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
no room for doubt
An amended statute, explicit in terms and leaving
31
on any point, would prevent further injustice.
Ronald B. Felman
CONSTRUCTIVE RELEASE OF Co-ToRTFEASORS FALLS

Following the granting of a general release in an auto negligence claim,
the plaintiff sustained aggravation of her injuries through maltreatment. In an
action to recover against the alleged malpractitioner, the bar of a general release
granted a fellow tortfeasor was raised. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals held,
where a general release is granted to one who has not acted jointly, in concert,
with his co-tortfeasors, the release will not by operation of law discharge the liabilities of such co-tortfeasors. Instead, availability of the release in their defense
presents questions of fact concerning the adequacy of the compensation had
by the grantor or the intention of the grantor to surrender all claims for less
than full compensation. Both issues are to be borne by the plaintiff. Derby v.
Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 187 N.E.2d 556, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1962) (three
judges dissenting).
English common law courts fashioned the rule of constructive release based
upon the concept of joint tort liability. Concerted action served the common
law courts as a link by which the individual joint tortfeasor could be held
vicariously liable for the entire damage produced by such conduct.1 This
liability was neither predicated upon causation in fact,2 nor upon 'foreseeability
of the damage that flowed from the act.3 The gist of the concept was the mutual
agency by which the act of one became the act of all.4 Since any one joint
tortfeasor was liable for the total damage by imputation of the fault of all, his
release was the release of all.r Of course this conclusion assumes that full compensation has been had for the release. At common law there was some excuse
for such an assumption. Releases were then sealed instruments, recitals in which
were conclusive. 6 Confusion over the meaning of a joint tortfeasor, the terms
as used in various contexts, led to the extension of the rule of release by operation of law to mere co-tortfeasors. 7 The corresponding rule in the law of
judgments did not share this development. Unsatisfied judgments against one
co-tortfeasor did not bar recovery against other co-tortfeasors. 8 Harsh rules
permit of harsh exceptions, so that the courts in order to mitigate the rigorous
result began by construction to view releases containing a reservation of claims
31.

16 St. John's L. Rev. 108 (1941).

1. Duck v. Mayeu, [18921 2 Q.B. 511; Prosser, Torts 234 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal. L. Rev. 413 (1932).
3. Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950).
4. Prosser, Torts 225, 234 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Southern Pacific Co. v. Raish, 205 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1953); Ludo v. Curran,
2 N.Y.2d 157, 139 N.E.2d 133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1956).
6. Williston, Contracts 3140 (1920).
7. Prosser, Torts 233, 242-43 (2d ed. 1955).
8. Id. at 241, 243.
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against others as covenants not to sue.9 The law would give effect to the intention of the grantor without belaboring the contradiction in terms, a generalreserved release. What had first been assumed by the courts, then effected
through exceptions, finally became the rule, itself. Satisfaction and intention
were to guide the efficacy of a release among co-tortfeasors. Today there is a
quickening trend to abolish the rule of constructive release even in its application to joint tortfeasors.10
Thirty years ago the Court of Appeals decided Milks v. McIver," a case
seemingly four-square with the present one. There, judge Lehman speaking
for the court held that a general release granted to a negligent motorist was
a bar to recovery against a malpractitioner for aggravation. The court so held
in the face of argument pressing the distinction between joint and co-tortfeasors.
Recently, the Court of Appeals in interpreting a statutory prohibition in the
Workmen's Compensation Law against unauthorized settlement of third party
actions allowed recoveries against both the initial and subsequent wrongdoers,
despite the fact that both recoveries were for the identical and all-inclusive
fatal injury.' 2 However, the decision is too rooted in the peculiarities of compensation law, especially the compromise between liability and compensation,
to be of great precedential value.
In the present case the majority, in trading the rule of constructive release
for the more fundamental standards of satisfaction and intention, strongly
attacked, both in argument and authority, automatic bar even as applied to
releases among joint tortfeasors. The obvious prediction is that this vestige
of constructive release simply awaits a proper case to be interred. A fortiori,
the majority found the application of automatic bar in the case of co-tortfeasors
objectionable, since it is easily demonstrated that the liabilities of co-tortfeasors
are, at least in extent, distinct. The malpractitioner did not cause the auto
accident. What point the dissenting opinion had, concerned the majority's
evasion of the Milks precedent and the difficulties of application presented by
the newly adopted broad standards. Milks should have been expressly overruled.
Attempted distinction of the case by fact differentiation and by imputation
of a second decisional ground seems unworthy of an otherwise well reasoned
and convincing majority opinion. Judge Lehman in the Milks decision did not
order a trial of the question of whether or not a complete satisfaction had been
obtained by the plaintiff. Yet, the majority now says that they, themselves,
9. Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
10. Eagle Lion Films, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 219 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1955); Daniel v.
Turner, 320 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1959); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958);
Riley v. Industrial Finance Service Co., 157 Tex. 306, 302 S.W.2d 652 (1957); Jukes
v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 181 Kan. 12, 309 P.2d 692 (1957); Weldon v. Lehmann,
226 Miss. 600, 84 So. 2d 796 (1956); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159

(1954).
11. 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1936); Rapp v. Myers, 291 N.Y. 709, 52 N.E.2d
596 (1943) (per curiam).
12. Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co., 8 N.Y.2d 293, 169 N.E.2d 913, 206
N.Y.S.2d 569 (1960); Note, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 284 (1961).
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must have that question tried before final disposition of the case. Nor does the
fact that the plaintiff had in the Milks case released the negligent motorist only
after sustaining aggravation of his initial injury distinguish a general rule which
applies automatically given the simple identification of co-tortfeasors. Secondly,
the dissenters point to the difficulty of measuring a full satisfaction. However,
tort verdicts do this work, perfectly or imperfectly, day in and day out. Accommodation of the law of contribution to the new standards does, however, remain
in need of change.' 3 Again as in so many of the advances made by the Court
of Appeals the charge of judicial legislation has been leveled in the dissent.
But as Chief Judge Desmond has observed, judicial change of judicial rules
is all too proper. It is enough to say that today's change was partial, interstitial, and overdue.
Mr. Justice Rutledge has admirably summarized the deficiencies of the
traditional rule:
The rule's results are incongruous. More often than otherwise they
are unjust and unintended. Wrongdoers who do not make or share in
making reparation are discharged, while one willing to right the wrong
and no more guilty bears the whole loss. Compromise is stifled,
first, by inviting all to wait for the others to settle and, second, because
claimants cannot accept less than full indemnity from one when doing
that discharges all. Many, not knowing this, accept less only to find
later they have walked into a trap. The rule shortchanges the claimant
or overcharges the person who settles, as the recurring volume and
pattern of litigation show. Finally, it is anomalous in legal theory,
giving tortfeasors an advantage wholly inconsistent with the nature
of their liability. 14
The metaphysical concept of constructive release is too far removed from the
realities of an intelligent, bargained settlement. The bargain is restricted to
all or nothing at all. Every number and kind of claim must, according to the
absolute bar, be resolved. Compromise of liability in the sense of a quid pro
quo is prevented. Needs of the grantor for present reparation, consideration of
the defendant's solvency, the relative costs and conveniences between litigation
and settlement of the various claims, all bearing on the decision to settle, have
to be abandoned or else. Nor can the bargain be intelligent. The law may
revisit consequences on the released tortfeasor for injuries that subsequently
arise, some unforseeable altogether. Regarded as a surrender of existent claims,
the release would be a more intelligent instrument. The constructive release
derived much of its vitality from the imperfections, in efficiencies and fears surrounding damage apportionment. 15 Failure to solve such difficulties, as Mr.
Justice Rutledge pointed out, ought to be charged against the wrongdoer, not
against the wronged. At the same time these difficulties are irrelevant to the
13.
14.
15.

N.Y. Law Revision Commission Reports 21 (1952).
McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
Prosser, Torts 224-25 (2d ed. 1955).
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concept of fault, which is the principle at stake. With ingenuity the difficulties
largely disappear. But now that the court has made it so clear that the liabilities of joint and co-tortfeasors are not necessarily identical with the other
members of their respective classes, it is hoped that the law of contribution
will be updated accordingly by legislative change.
Donald P. Simet
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES-PRVITY No LONGER REQUIRED

An American Airlines carrier crashed in New York killing plaintiff's
intestate, a passenger. An action for wrongful death was commenced against
American for negligence, and against both the manufacturer of the aircraft,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, and the manufacturer of an allegedly defective
altimeter in the said aircraft, Kollsman Instrument Corp., both for breach of
implied warranty of fitness. Motions brought by both Lockheed and Kollsman
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute causes
of action pursuant to Rule 106(4) of the Rules of Civil Practice were granted.
On affirmance by the Appellate Division, plaintiff appealed by permission to the
Court of Appeals. Held, (4-3)-reversed as to the manufacturer of the aircraft,
Lockheed, affirmed as to the manufacturer of the altimeter, Kollsman. The
implied warranty of fitness of the manufacturer which put the assembled
aircraft into the market runs in favor of all intended users of the product
despite lack of privity of contract between such users and the manufacturer;
no remedy lies against the manufacturer of the defective component part since
there is adequate remedy against the manufacturer of the aircraft. Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963).
In Winterbottom v. Wright,' the general rule that a manufacturer of a
defective product is not liable to users not in privity of contract entered the
realm of Anglo-American jurisprudence. From the outset, the privity doctrine,
at best, proved to be a hard pill for courts to prescribe. An exception early
arose as to articles of manufacture "inherently dangerous to life and health." 2
Judge Cardozo's landmark MacPherson decision3 in 1916, citing prior New York
cases which had created exceptions to the privity doctrine, 4 imposed liability in
negligence, regardless of privity, upon a manufacturer in favor of the ultimate
consumer. MacPherson dealt the death blow to the vestige of the strict Winterbottom influence in New York and rapidly became accepted in the vast majority
1. 10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); see, e.g., National Say. Bank
v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
2. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). See generally Prosser,
Torts § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
3. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4. E.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852) (mislabeled
poison bottle); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909)
(exploding coffee urn: liability to bystanders).

